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Abstract: A network attack is a set of network elements that are disabled by an ad-
versary. The goal for the attack is to produce the most possible damage to the network
in terms of network connectivity by disabling the least possible number of network
elements. We show that the problem of ﬁnding the optimal attack in a serverless net-
work is NP-Complete even when only edges or nodes are considered for disabling. We
study a node attack policy with polynomial complexity based on shorter paths and
show that this attack policy outperforms in most cases classical attacks policies such
as random attack or maximum degree attack. We also study the behavior of diﬀerent
network topologies under these attack policies.
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1 Introduction
An attack is a set of network elements that are disabled by an adversary. The goal
of the attack is to disconnect some elements of the network from others. Quasi-
optimal attacks for pairs of nodes where only edges can be disabled are found
in polynomial time by means of MIN CUT algorithms [Stoer and Wagner 1997].
The resistance of the network and optimal reinforcement against an edge based
attack is studied in [Cunningham 1985].
The resistance to node and/or edge based attacks strategies for a given
network model (meshes, rings, random, regular, etc) and the study of opti-
mal topologies that present a high resistance to speciﬁc attack strategies has
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been the object of many studies as part of the area of “Survivable networks”
[Fortz 2000, Grover 2003]. In [Albert et al. 2000] the tolerance to random failure
and maximal degree node disabling is investigated over random networks and
Scale-Free (SF) networks from a physics and statistical mechanics point of view.
Recently, the stability of multimedia networks under attacks has been studied in
[Koukopulos 2009]. In [Leiwo et al. 2000] the problem of ﬁnding the minimal set
of nodes whose removal produces the maximal damage in terms of connectivity
to a single given node is shown to be NP-Complete. The design of fault tolerant
networks for arrays and meshes is studied in [Zhang 2000].
In this paper we study the complexity of ﬁnding the optimal attack in terms
of cost and damage to a serverless network. Serverless networks present spe-
ciﬁc characteristics, such as the lack of a single centralized authority and many
control services are to be maintained in a distributed way. These facts implies
that new attack strategies, attack resistant networks and attack damage met-
rics need to be developed. In this kind of networks the damage of a given at-
tack cannot be measured any more as a function of the connectivity to a sin-
gle nod, otherwise, the damage of a given attack is usually measured as the
size of the biggest connected component of the graph resulting after the attack
[Albert et al. 2002, Albert et al. 2000]. In [Abdelouahab et al. 2009] an attack
strategy over a particular case of serverless networks, the P2P networks, is stud-
ied. Strategies for detecting Distributed Denial of Service ﬂood based attacks
have been developed [Li 2004, Li 2006], as in the case of attack strategies, new
metrics and methods are needed to develop these strategies for not centralized
networks.
In section 2, the exact deﬁnitions of serverless communication networks model,
attack, cost and damage of an attack and network resistance are provided among
other. In section 3 we state precisely the Optimal Attack Problem as the prob-
lem of ﬁnding an attack that produces a given damage with a cost below a
given budget, we also state that such a problem is NP-Complete. In section 4
we provide some approximate attack algorithms, ﬁnally, in section 5 we also
study the resistance to diﬀerent node attack policies for several network models:
Ring-lattices, Small-World (SW), SF, Random, a mixed model SF-SW and a
real graph representing the connectivity of the Western US power grid.
2 Model of Serverless Communication Networks
A serverless communication network is a quadruple CN = {V,E, c, s} where
1. V = {v1, · · · , v|V |} is the set of nodes,
2. E = {e1, · · · , e|E|} : V × V → {0, 1} is the set of edges,
3. c : V ∪E → Z+ ∪ {∞} is a cost function and
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4. s : V → [0, 1] is a signiﬁcance function.
The cost function is a measure of how much it costs to an enemy to disable
an element of the network, the inﬁnity value means that the element can’t be
disabled by any attack. The signiﬁcance function is an indication of the relevance
of the node and therefore how bad is that other elements of the network become
disconnected from the node. Cost and signiﬁcance are a priori data over the set
of nodes and edges. The cost function could be used, for example, to represent
the computational eﬀort or the economical expenses or simply the time needed
to disable the node or the edge and the signiﬁcance function could represent,
for example, how many users obtain a denial of a given service (Internet access,
data access) in the case that the node is disabled by the attack.
We deﬁne an Attack A ⊂ V ∪E over a communication network CN as a set
of disabled nodes and edges. A cut is an attack that succeeds in disconnecting
the graph. In a disconnected graph, each maximal set of connected nodes forms
a connected component of the graph. We deﬁne the signiﬁcance S of a connected
component as the sum of the signiﬁcances of its elements.
S(V ′) =
|V |∑
i=1
s(vi) with vi ∈ V ′ (1)
where V ′ is a connected component of V .
The signiﬁcance can be calculated for each connected component of the
graph. The connected component with the highest signiﬁcance is named the
core Bcc of the graph. If the graph is connected, the core coincides with the
graph. In this paper we assume without loss of generality for our purposes that
Bcc is unique.
For a given attack A we deﬁne arbitrarily the cost C of the attack to the
communication network CN as the sum of the costs of the elements of CN
disabled by the attack A, i.e.
CCN (A) =
|V |+|E|∑
i=1
c(xi) with xi ∈ A (2)
We also deﬁne the damage D produced in the communication network CN
by the attack A as the sum of the signiﬁcances of the nodes that are disconnected
from the core. More formally,
DCN(A) =
|V |∑
i=1
s(vi) with xi /∈ Bcc (3)
We deﬁne the resistance R of the communication network CN to the attack
A as the signiﬁcance of the elements that are in Bcc, this is,
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RCN (A) =
|V |∑
i=1
s(vi) with vi ∈ Bcc (4)
Finally we deﬁne the eﬃciency of an attack A to a communication network
CN as:
PCN (A) =
DCN(A)
CCN(A)
(5)
3 Optimal attack problem
We can now deﬁne the optimal attack problem (OPT ATTACK) to a serverless
network CN in the following terms:
Problem OPT ATTACK: Given a serverless communication network CN and
two ﬁxed values C and D, does there exist an attack A such as CCN (A) ≤ C
and DCN (A) ≥ D ?
Theorem 1 The OPT ATTACK problem is NP-Complete even in the case
of bidirectional links, s(v) = 1 ∀ v ∈ V , c(v) =∞ ∀ v ∈ V and c(e) = 1 ∀ e ∈ E.
Note that in this case Bcc coincides with the biggest connected component of
the graph and the signiﬁcance of a connected component coincides with its size.
Proof We ﬁrst show that OPT ATTACK ∈ NP .
Suppose we are given a communication network CN , an attack A and two
numbers C and D. We need to ﬁnd an algorithm that checks in polynomial time
that a given solution solves the problem. We choose as a solution the attack
A. The veriﬁcation algorithm checks that CCN (A) ≤ C and DCN (A) ≥ D by
ﬁnding the biggest connected component Bcc after the attack. An algorithm of
order O(|E|+|V |log|V |) for ﬁnding the connected components of a given graphG
can be found in [Cormen et al. 1998]. The biggest connected component can be
found in time of the order at most O(|V |) and the damage of A can be calculated
by adding the size of the remaining connected components in the graph in time
of the order at most O(|V |). The program can also compute the cost C of A
simply adding the cost of the elements of A. Therefore this veriﬁcation can be
performed in polynomial time.
We prove that OPT ATTACK is NP-Complete by describing a polynomial
reduction to the problem of minimal bisection. The minimal bisection problem
consist in ﬁnding the minimal set of edges that divide the set of nodes V of
a given graph G into two disjoint sets V1, V2 such as |V1| = |V2| = |V |/2 and
V1 ∪ V2 = V . The size of the bisection is the number of edges (v1, v2) ∈ E such
v1 ∈ V1 and v2 ∈ V2. It can be proved that the minimal bisection problem is
NP-Complete [Garey and Johnson 1976].
Now we show that OPT ATTACK is NP-Complete.
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Let us consider the graph G = (V,E) for the minimal bisection problem. Let
us construct a new graph G′ adding a new extra node s and connecting this new
node with each of the |V | nodes of G by (|V |2/4) + 1 routes to each node in G.
Each route will consist of an auxiliary node aiv i = 0, · · · , (|V |2/4) + 1, an edge
from s to the auxiliary node aiv and an edge from aiv to node v in the graph. This
new graph G′ veriﬁes |V ′| = |V |3/4+ 2|V |+ 1 and |E′| = |E|+ 2(|V |3/4 + |V |).
Now we assign a serverless communication network to the ampliﬁed graph G′:
– V ′ = V ∪ {s} ∪ {aiv|v ∈ V and i = 1 · · · (n2/4) + 1}
– E′ = E ∪ {(s, aiv), (aiv, s), (v, aiv), (aiv, v) | v ∈ V and i = 1 · · ·n2/4 + 1}
– c(e) = 1 if e ∈ E′, c(v) =∞ if v ∈ V ′
– s(v) = 1 if v ∈ V ′
s
n  /4+12
G
G’ n  /4+1
2
Figure 1: Polynomial reduction of optimal attack to graph bisection
Lemma The original graph G has a bisection of size B, 1 ≤ B ≤ |V |2/4 <
|V |2/4+ 1 if and only if (⇐⇒) the serverless communication network G′ has an
attack A with DG′(A) ≥ 12
(
|V |3
4 + |V |
)
+ |V |2 and CG′(A) ≤ 12
(
|V |3
4 + |V |
)
+B.
only if (=⇒) If there exists a bisection B = (V1, V2) of size lower or equal to B we
construct an attack A in the following way, A = {(v1, v2) ∈ E | v1 ∈ V1 and v2 ∈
V2}∪{(aivj , s) ∈ E′−E | vj ∈ V1 and i = 1 · · · (|V |2/4)+1}. The cost of this attack
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is clearly CG′(A) ≤ 12
(
|V |3
4 + |V |
)
+B. This attack disconnects 12
(
|V |3
4 + |V |
)
+
|V |
2 nodes from the connected component of size
1
2
(
|V |3
4 + |V |
)
+ |V |2 + 1 that
contains the extra node s. As the connected component that contains s has a size
bigger that |V ′|/2 = 12 (|V |3/4+2|V |+1) its clear that the connected component
that contains s is Bcc of graph G′. This means that the damage produced by A is
the size of the elements of V ′ that do not belong to Bcc i.e. 12
(
|V |3
4 + |V |
)
+ |V |2 .
if (⇐=) As DG′(A) ≥ 12
(
|V |3
4 + |V |
)
+ |V |2 and |V ′| = |V |3/4+2|V |+1 then the
size of Bcc is at most |V ′| −DG′(A) = |V |
3
8 + |V |+1. This means that any node
in the graph G′ (and in particular the special node s) must be disconnected from
at least |V ′| − |Bcc| = |V |
3
8 + |V | nodes in the graph G′.
Suppose now that the attack disconnects from s a number t of nodes from the
original graph G with t < |V |/2. As s must be disconnected from t nodes from
V this means that it is necessary to cut the |V |
2
4 +1 routes through the auxiliary
nodes aiv from the extra node s to each of the t nodes. This makes necessary
to disable t
(
|V |2
4 + 1
)
links that also disconnects t
(
|V |2
4 + 1
)
auxiliary nodes.
Now we need also disconnect at least |V |
3
8 + |V | −
(
t
(
|V |2
4 + 1
)
+ t
)
nodes by
disabling at most 12
(
|V |3
4 + |V |
)
+B − t
(
|V |2
4 + 1
)
links.
As it is not possible to disconnect more nodes from the original graph G,
the nodes to be disconnected must be auxiliary nodes corresponding to nodes
of G that are still in the same connected component of s. We have to dis-
able the links that lie at the both sides of auxiliary nodes with a total cost of
2
((
|V |3
8 + |V |
)
−
(
t
(
|V |2
4 + 1
)
+ t
))
= 12
(
|V |3
4 + |V |
)
− t
(
|V |2
4 + 1
)
+(
|V |
2 − t
)(
|V |2
4 + 3
)
> 12
(
|V |3
4 + |V |
)
− t
(
|V |2
4 + 1
)
+ B due to |V |2 − t ≥ 1,(
|V |2
4 + 3
)
> |V |
2
4 and
|V |2
4 ≥ B. This means that the attack cannot disconnect
from s less than t < |V |/2 nodes of the original graph G.
Suppose now that t > |V |/2 nodes fromG are disconnected from s. To discon-
nect a node that belongs to V from the extra node s it is necessary to disable at
least the |V |2/4+1 routes through the auxiliary nodes. As 12
(
|V |3
4 + |V |
)
+B ≤(
|V |
2 + 1
)(
|V |2
4 + 1
)
< t
(
|V |2
4 + 1
)
this means that it is not possible to discon-
nect from s more that |V |/2 nodes. It follows that in the previous conditions an
attack must disconnect from s exactly |V |/2 nodes of the original graph G.
To disconnect the |V |/2 nodes fromG from smeans a budget of 12
(
|V |3
4 + |V |
)
allowing at most B for the disabling of further links. The disconnection of the
|V |/2 nodes from G in this way also disconnects the 12 |V |
3
4 + |V | auxiliary nodes
in the routes from the |V |/2 nodes from G to s. This means that a bisection of
weight B or less exists in G if we can separate the |V |2 nodes from G that are
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connected with s from the |V |2 nodes that are not connected with s by disabling
at most B edges from G. 
The previous theorem can also be established in the case of node based
attacks, i.e. s(v) = 1 ∀ v ∈ V , c(v) = 1 ∀ v ∈ V and c(e) = ∞ ∀ e ∈ E. In this
case Bcc again coincides with the biggest connected component of the graph and
the relevance of a connected component coincides with its size.
To establish the theorem for node based attacks in a given graph G = (V,E)
let us construct a new graph G′ = (V ′, E′) by adding a new extra node vij in
the middle of each edge (vi, vj) ∈ E, see ﬁgure 2.
Now we assign a serverless communication network to the ampliﬁed graph
G′:
– V ′ = V ∪ {vij |(vi, vj) ∈ E}
– E′ = {(vi, vij)|vi ∈ V and vij ∈ V ′}
– c(e) =∞, c(v) =∞ if v ∈ V and c(v) = 1 if v ∈ V ′ − V
– s(v) = 1 if v ∈ V ′
The result follows now by simply applying Theorem 1 to G′.
G’G
Figure 2: Graph for edges based attacks
4 Approximate algorithms
The previous theorem indicates the necessity of the design of approximate al-
gorithms for the problem of ﬁnding optimal attacks. The behavior of random
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networks and SF networks under approximate attack algorithms based on ran-
dom selection of the nodes and removal of highly connected nodes is studied
by means of computer simulations in [Albert et al. 2000]. In [Holme et al. 2002,
Shargel el al. 2003] the “Attack vulnerability” of complex networks to approxi-
mate algorithms based on removal of nodes with maximum number of connec-
tions and removal of nodes with the highest “betweenness” (i.e. the nodes that
appear most frequently in every possible path for each pair of nodes in the graph)
is investigated. The “betweenness” is a measure of the centrality of a given node
in a network and is exactly calculated as the number of times that the node
appears in the shorter paths between the node pairs in the graph. This quan-
tity indicates which are the most important nodes in terms of control of ﬂow
of information between pairs of nodes in the network, and their removal would
signiﬁcantly aﬀect to the network connectivity [Newman 2001]. Finding all the
node independent paths between a given pair of nodes is a known NP-Complete
problems, this fact calls for approximate algorithms to ﬁnd this quantity, as
proposed in [White and Newman 2001] or in [Newman 2005]. The approximate
“betweenness” algorithm presents the best results but at the cost of a high com-
putational complexity O(|V |4 ∗ |E|). Here we study an approximate algorithm
based on minimal paths with a lower computational complexity O(|V |3) that
produces similar damage over a set of network models that the “betweenness”
algorithm.
We are going to describe the attack algorithms under consideration and cal-
culate the computational complexity of the algorithms.
4.1 Random Failure
This strategy consists of the random removal of nodes that have not been pre-
viously removed from the network. The node to be removed is drawn from an
uniform distribution and is ca
Failure
j= 1
n=|V|
while j < n
node=aleat(V)
V = V - node
j++
End Failure
Where V is the set of nodes in the graph, the function aleat(V ) returns a
node selected at random among the nodes that have not been removed from the
network. If we assume that the function aleat(V ) has a computational complexity
O(1) it is easy to see that the algorithm has complexity O(|V |).
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4.2 Degree Based Attack
This strategy is based on the idea that removal of the most connected nodes
in terms of their number of neighbors will cause higher damage to the network
connectivity.
AttackDegree
j= 1
n=|V|
while j < |V|
node=MostConected(V)
V = V - node
j++
End Attack
In general an implementation of MostConected will need to cover the list
of nodes that has not been previously removed and to count the number of
neighbors that each of the nodes has. It is necessary to point out that each
time a node is removed, the number of neighbors of other nodes in the graph
is modiﬁed. The asymptotic behavior of this algorithm is |V | + (|V | − 1) +
(|V | − 2) + · · · + 1, where each term in the sum corresponds to a call to the
function MostConected(G) . This means, adding the previous expression, that
the computational complexity of this algorithm is O(|V |2).
4.3 Minimal Path Based Attack
This method is based on the concept of node “betweeness” [Newman 2001] as-
suming that the nodes that appear in the highest number of shorter paths be-
tween pair would cause the highest damage in terms of connectivity if they are
removed.
AttackMinPath
j= 1
n=|V|
while j < n
For each u in V
ind[u]=0
For each u,v in V
C = minimal path from u to v
for each node k in C
ind[k]++
node = k such as ind[k] is maximum
V = V - node
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j++
End AttackMinPath
At each iteration, for the calculation of the minimal path between every
pair of nodes in the graph we can perform |V | − j + 1 calls to a Dijkstra-like
[Cormen et al. 1998] algorithm for the |V |−j+1 nodes that has not been removed
from the graph. Given that Dijkstra’s algorithm has a complexity O(|V |+ |E|)
and considering disperse graphs, (in particular we have |E| ∝ |V |), the execution
time of the algorithm is |V |2+(|V |−1)2+ · · ·+1. This means that our algorithm
has a complexity O(|V |3). In the case of dense graphs, there exist algorithms
that calculate exactly a path between every pair of nodes in the graph with
a complexity O(log(|V |)|V |2.376) [Seidel 1995]. The minimal path based attack
algorithm can also be approximated by a statistic method by selecting only a
subset of the total set of pairs of nodes in the graph.
5 Network topologies
We are going to study the algorithms presented in the previous section over a
set of diﬀerent topologies. These topologies represent the most usual models of
complex networks that are proposed in the bibliography. In particular the models
under study are:
5.1 Regular Network
Regular networks are mainly used in analytic studies of the performance of
protocols or in the study of the behavior of some metrics. The structure of the
regular network makes tractable the study of some problems [Zhang 2000].
5.2 Real Network
The models based on real networks are used for the study of the properties of
that particular network. The main problem of these models is that the results
are not only limited to that particular network but also the results are only valid
for a relatively short period of time due to the fact that most of the real networks
grow by augmenting the number of nodes and/or edges or by simply changing
its connectivity. In general these networks are used to test that the metrics
selected in other types of network coincide with the ones present in real networks.
As an example of Real Network, in this work we have selected the publicly
available data of the Power grid of the west of United States [Matrixmarket].
This particular real network also present an order, clustering and average path
similar to the artiﬁcial network models under consideration in this work what
makes it suitable for comparison with the artiﬁcial topologies.
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5.3 Random Network
Random Networks are networks where the connections between nodes are es-
tablished at random These networks were studied mainly by Erdo¨s and Re´nyi
[Erdo¨s and Re´nyi 1959] and Bollobas [Bollobas 2001]. These works are based
mainly on the fact that most of the properties of the random graphs can be
studied analytically by probabilistic methods.
5.4 Transit-Stub Hierarchical Network
Transit-stub hierarchic topologies are presented in [Aguirre et al. 2003]. This
topologies represent networks where sets of nodes are connected with the rest
of the network by a small number of outputs. These networks resemble most
accurately certain networks such as communication networks or the Internet
[Zegura et al. 1997].
5.5 Small-World Network
Small-World networks [Watts 1999, Watts and Strogatz 1998] are networks with
high local clustering and small distances between the nodes. SW topologies
present some very interesting features that make them very suitable for eﬃ-
cient transmission of commodities [Aguirre et al. 2000]. They appear naturally
in many real life networks.
5.6 Scale-Free Network
The Scale-Free model [Baraba´si and Albert 1999] shows a power law distribution
of the degrees of the nodes. This model presents a short distance between nodes
and a low clustering coeﬃcient.
5.7 Mixed Scale-Free Small-world Network
We also consider a mixed SF-SW model with n = 2000 and < k >= 8 with
high local clustering, small distance between nodes and a power law degree
distribution. This mixed model has been built in three steps, ﬁrst we build a
SF graph G1 = V,E1 following the Baraba´si and Albert model with param-
eters m0 = m = k/2 and t = n − m0. Then we build a regular ring lattice
G2 = (V,E2) with degree k′ = k/2 that uses the set of nodes generated in G1.
Finally we build the graph G = G1∪G2. This strategy corresponds with the fact
presented in [Boudourides and Antypas 2002] where in the evolution process of
a communication network, besides the preferential connection scheme presented
in the SF networks, each node establishes connection with nodes that present
2757Aguirre C., Huerta R., Tsimring L.: Optimal Serverless Networks ...
L C B
RING 125.438 0.643 1
POWER GRID 15.808 0.056 428
RANDOM 3.89 0.004 6
TRANSIT STUB 18.77 0.75 183
SMALL-WORLD 14.2 0.626 1
SCALE-FREE 3.409 0.019 1
MIXED 3.744 0.157 1
Table 1: Values of L and C and B for diﬀerent graphs models
similar characteristics (geographic, thematic, etc). As can be seen in table 1 this
model presents a high clustering and a low path length maintaining a power law
distribution of the degree of the nodes.
In this work we will study the following networks:
– Regular topologies: Regular ring-lattice with |V | = 2000, < k >= 8,
– Real topologies: Power grid of the west of United States |V | = 1454, < k >=
2.66,
– Random topologies: Erdo¨s and Re´nyi model random network |V | = 2000,
< k >= 8,
– Hierarchical topologies: Transit-Stub Regular graph |V | = 2000, < k >= 8,
– Small-World topologies: SW graph obtained from a regular ring-lattice |V | =
2000, < k >= 8 and p = .01,
– Scale-Free topologies: Baraba´si and Albert model SF graph |V | = 2000,
< k >= 8,
– Mixed Scale-Free Small-world topology |V | = 2000, < k >= 8,
where < k > is the average number of neighbors of each node in the graph.
In order to measure the connectivity of a given network, the most common
parameters are the average path distance L, the cluster coeﬃcient C, number of
biconnected components B and the distribution of the nodes degrees p(k). The
average path distance is a global parameter that shows how far are the nodes of
the graph from each other in terms of their shortest path. The cluster coeﬃcient
is a local measure that captures the cliquishness of the neighbors of each node
in the graph. Random graphs and SF graphs present a low L and C meanwhile
SW graphs present a low L but a high C.
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There are some analytical results for the resistance to attacks to some of the
previous networks, in particular, the behavior of edge removal in a random net-
work is studied in [Margulis 1974, Bollobas 2001, Cohen et al. 2000]. The Resis-
tance to random attacks in scale free networks is studied in [Albert et al. 2002].
For the study of the resistance of networks attacks we have used an approach
similar to the one followed in [Albert et al. 2000] and [Holme et al. 2002]. In our
work we have simulated in a computer the behavior of diﬀerent attack strate-
gies for most network topologies. This approach allows the comparison of the
behavior of diﬀerent attacks strategies and networks topologies under a common
framework.
6 Results
In Figures 3 and 4 the behavior of the diﬀerent models when we use diﬀerent
attack algorithms is depicted. Each value of the x axis is an attack that is
determined by its cost. The y axis represent the resistance of the network to
that attack.
In Figure 3 it is possible to see that the SW-SF mixed topology shows it-
self as the most resistant topology when random failures are considered. The
SW topology presents the highest resistance to attacks based on the removal
of highly connected nodes. When shortest path based attacks are considered,
the best results are presented by graphs with random distribution of its connec-
tion pattern. Hierarchical networks yield the worst general resistance to attacks.
This is due to the high number of articulation points present in this kind of
network. Hierarchical is the artiﬁcial model that demonstrates a behavior that
corresponds most accurately with the results presented by the power grid of the
west of the United States.
On the other hand, the attacks based on maximal node degree are not the
ones that produce the highest damage in SF networks. As it is shown in Figure
4, for the same given cost, the algorithm based on shortest paths produces a
higher damage in all the considered topologies when compared with the attacks
based on maximal degree. The attack based on shortest path presents a similar
eﬃciency when compared with the algorithms studied in [Holme et al. 2002]. It
can be seen that in all the considered models there exist a rapid change in the
behavior of the resistance. That is, there exists a value Ch such as C > Ch
R(A) ∼ 0. In tables 2 and 3 the values f0.01 = min{C(A)/R(A) < 0.01} and
the average value of R(A) are shown for the diﬀerent attack strategies over the
considered network models. This change of behavior can be utilized as another
measure of the eﬃciency of the algorithm.
In table 4 it is shown that the algorithm based on shortest paths presents
the best eﬃciency in every kind of network. The worst eﬃciency for the three
types of algorithms are obtained in the random and mixed topologies.
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Figure 3: Graphs resistance for diﬀerent attack strategies.
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Figure 4: Resistance to attacks for diﬀerent kinds of graphs.
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Failure Degree Min path
RING 0.26 0.33 0.02
POWER GRID 0.20 0.07 0.02
RANDOM 0.47 0.35 0.34
TRANSIT STUB 0.25 0.22 0.01
SMALL-WORLD 0.36 0.35 0.05
SCALE FREE 0.47 0.23 0.22
MIXED 0.48 0.32 0.27
Table 2: Average value of the network resistance to diﬀerent attack strategies.
Failure Degree Min path
RING 0.71 0.60 0.26
POWER GRID 0.66 0.19 0.13
RANDOM 0.89 0.52 0.47
TRANSIT STUB 0.81 0.57 0.07
SMALL-WORLD 0.70 0.61 0.27
SCALE FREE 0.93 0.35 0.30
MIXED 0.91 0.49 0.39
Table 3: Value of f0.01 for diﬀerent attack strategies.
7 Summary, conclusions and future work
In this paper we have investigated the complexity of the problem of optimal
attack to a serverless network. We have provided the necessary deﬁnitions and
stated that the problem is NP-Complete even in the case when only edges or
nodes can be removed. We have constructed an auxiliary graph in order to show
that there exists a polynomial reduction of this problem to the minimal bisection
Failure Degree Min path
RING 1.50 1.29 4.87
POWER GRID 1.80 2.88 4.23
RANDOM 1.03 1.25 1.28
TRANSIT STUB 1.77 1.81 5.28
SMALL-WORLD 1.24 1.24 3.21
SCALE FREE 1.04 1.62 1.66
MIXED 1.03 1.31 1.45
Table 4: Average value of the eﬃciency for diﬀerent attack strategies.
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problem. We have also studied an approximate algorithm with a computational
complexity of orderO(|V |3) based on minimal paths that outperforms algorithms
based on random failures or maximal node degree. This algorithm presents simi-
lar eﬃciency when compared with algorithms of higher computational complex-
ity. With the increasing relevance of P2P networks more and most powerful
approximate attack methods, and attack resistance topologies are needed, some
very interesting works are appearing last years [Li 2004, Li 2006], but a further
eﬀort is needed to develop new techniques suitable to not centralized networks.
These methods also could allow variable cost and damage functions instead of a
priori ﬁxed values.
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